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Fordham University* 
One of the most innovative aspects of enactivism, beginning with 1991’s 
The Embodied Mind1, was its insistence on placing lived experience at the 
center of cognitive science research. To that end, early enactivists drew 
inspiration from phenomenology and non-Western traditions (especially 
Buddhist and Yogic) of reflection upon experience. Among the 
phenomenologists, enactivism found a natural ally in Merleau-Ponty. Much 
more so than his German predecessors, Merleau-Ponty moved freely between 
empirical and phenomenological research, allowing the findings of each to be 
revised and refined in light of the other. Hence, the authors of The Embodied 
Mind credit Merleau-Ponty with being one of the few in the Western tradition 
“whose work was committed to an exploration of the fundamental entre-deux 
between science and experience, experience and world.”2 
Beyond this methodological convergence, Merleau-Ponty also exhibited 
an interest throughout his writings in numerous central themes of enactivist 
thought. One of these is what has come to be known in contemporary 
cognitive science as the life-mind continuity thesis: the idea that there are 
basic organizational properties common to the organic domain and the mind, 
with the latter being an enrichment of the former.3 In his investigations into 
animal psychology and the philosophy of biology, Merleau-Ponty presented 
rich resources for enactivists to mine in their formulation of the life-mind 
continuity thesis. However, in the same writings we also find stark assertions 
of the differences between various types of organic, sensorimotor, and 
intelligent creatures. This is especially true where the phenomenological 
dimension of life-mind continuity is concerned. This is the idea, inspired by 
the phenomenologist Hans Jonas, that certain features of (paradigmatically) 
human experience described by existential phenomenologists apply 
throughout the organic domain to the experience of all living beings.  
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I will argue that in their adoption of Merleau-Ponty, enactivists ought to 
pay greater attention to the differences he stressed within continuity. 
Moreover, returning to a Merleau-Pontian version of the life-mind continuity 
thesis can provide enactivists with a more defensible version of 
phenomenological continuity. Returning to Merleau-Ponty clarifies the role 
of phenomenology within enactivism. And it responds to confusion 
generated by the application of phenomenological concepts to describe the 
“experience” of creatures that have no phenomenal consciousness, thus 
undermining allegations of anthropomorphism.4 It also suggests an account 
of the continuity-amid-discontinuity between humans and other higher 
animals that fills in this chapter of the enactivist story while avoiding the 
uncomfortably stark dualism of content-involving and non-content-involving 
minds with which some radical accounts are saddled.5 However, as we will 
see, a few slight modifications to Merleau-Ponty’s view are required in light 
of new findings in comparative and developmental psychology from recent 
decades. 
In the first part of this paper, I discuss enactivism’s life-mind continuity 
thesis, its phenomenological dimension in particular. I criticize on textual 
grounds the appeal to Merleau-Ponty, arguing that he held a view of 
continuity that is importantly at odds with the enactivist view, especially 
where organisms with no sensorimotor system are concerned. On 
phenomenological and philosophical grounds, we should side with Merleau-
Ponty. In the second part, I explore the prospects for a revised Merleau-
Pontian continuity thesis within contemporary enactivism. I discuss Merleau-
Ponty’s views on the continuity and discontinuity between the cognition and 
experience of humans and that of nonhuman higher animals. Though there is 
an astonishing convergence between Merleau-Ponty’s views and views that 
can be found in the most recent developmental and comparative psychology, 
I claim that Merleau-Ponty slightly overestimates the differences between 
human cognition and that of our closest primate kin. Viewing uniquely 
human modes of cognition in a developmental light allows us to reassert a 
stronger continuity (amid discontinuity) between human cognition and 
experience and that of higher animals. 
 
Merleau-Ponty and Enactivism on Life-mind Continuity 
Enactivism’s life-mind continuity thesis 
The life-mind continuity thesis is a central component of the enactivist 
account of life and mind.6 Stated succinctly, it maintains that “life and mind 
share a set of basic organizational properties, and the organizational 
properties distinctive of mind are an enriched version of those fundamental 
to life.”7 Different authors defend different versions of the thesis, and 
sometimes different aspects within one version. I will focus on Evan 
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Thompson’s version, as he has presented it in Mind in Life and other works, 
drawing on the autopoietic theory of life developed by Maturana and Varela 
and phenomenological approaches to life and behavior developed by Hans 
Jonas and Merleau-Ponty (though, as I shall suggest presently, this “Jonas-
and-Merleau-Ponty” coupling may not be as felicitous as is sometimes 
assumed).8 
There are two aspects to Thompson’s life-mind continuity thesis, which 
we might call the empirical and phenomenological dimensions of life-mind 
continuity. The empirical dimension is determined by the autopoietic 
conception of life drawn from Varela’s and Maturana’s work in theoretical 
biology. Varela provides a simplified definition of an autopoietic system.9 For 
a system to be autopoietic, 
(i) the system must have a semipermeable boundary; (ii) the 
boundary must be produced by a network of reactions that 
takes place within the boundary; and (iii) the network of 
reactions must include reactions that regenerate the 
components of the system.10 
An autopoietic system is a self-producing, self-sustaining entity 
individuated from its surroundings by its boundary. At the same time, 
enactivism extends the concept of cognition to apply to all living systems 
defined as autopoietic systems. On the enactivist account, “cognition” simply 
involves acting or behaving towards the organism’s environment in ways that 
are relevant for the production and sustenance of the organism. In this 
respect, all organisms, not only those with nervous systems, are autopoietic-
cognitive systems.11 The most basic case, one often used as an illustration in 
enactivist writings, is the unicellular organism.12 
What, then, of the phenomenological dimension of life-mind continuity? 
This is where Jonas enters the picture. Jonas provides a phenomenological 
interpretation of basic biological phenomena. The key notion for him is 
metabolism. Jonas’ claim is that wherever we find the chemico-biological 
processes of metabolism, the energetic processes through which an organism 
produces and sustains itself, we find also in nuce the same existential 
conditions that shape human existence. As such, the same categories used by 
phenomenologists and existentialists to describe human existence can also be 
predicated non-equivocally of a unicellular organism. As Jonas puts it, “the 
great contradictions which man discovers in himself […] have their 
rudimentary traces in even the most primitive forms of life.”13 Just as the 
autopoietic notion of cognition applies to all living things from the simplest 
autopoietic entities up to complex animals, so, too, for Jonas and those 
enactivists who follow him, phenomenological-existential categories apply 
from humans all the way down to the simplest metabolic creatures. The 
domain of creatures covered by the autopoietic dimension of the life-mind 
continuity thesis is thus coextensive with that covered by the Jonasian 
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existential-phenomenological one. They are complementary theses, 
describing the same phenomena from the objective and subjective 
perspectives respectively. 
My main purpose is not to assess the autopoietic-empirical and Jonasian-
phenomenological versions of the life-mind continuity thesis on their own 
merits. Hence, these brief sketches will suffice for present purposes. I am more 
concerned to ask whether Merleau-Ponty’s own view on life-mind continuity 
(a term, to my knowledge, that he never employs14) complements the 
Jonasian-autopoietic synthesis just as comfortably as those Jonasian and 
autopoietic aspects fit together. Prior to the chapters discussing autopoiesis 
and the Jonasian philosophy of the organism in Thompson’s Mind in Life, we 
find a chapter on Merleau-Ponty’s first book, The Structure of Behavior. 
Merleau-Ponty’s objective in Structure is to “understand the relationships of 
consciousness and nature”15 – and, indeed, this remains one of the guiding 
objectives of his entire oeuvre. To that end, in Structure, Merleau-Ponty 
surveys a broad array of studies on animal behavior to conduct an immanent 
critique of the notion of behavior as employed in the psychology of his time. 
He attempts gradually to show the cracks in the objectivist conception of 
behavior (e.g., that of behaviorism), demonstrating the need for a 
phenomenologically informed approach. Merleau-Ponty understands 
behavior as a structure, or form: a whole in which the parts can only be 
understood with reference to the whole.  
This cashes out in various ways for the understanding of behavior. For 
one, against approaches that attempt to understand behavior as a sort of 
elaborate conditioned reflex, Merleau-Ponty finds that behavior is always an 
achievement of the whole organism, comprising the nervous system and the 
rest of the body. It is not the independent function of this or that isolated 
neural mechanism or body part. Further, such behavior can only be 
understood as the coupling of the organism with its environment. The latter 
cannot be understood as objectivistically described array of pure stimuli, but 
must be understood in the sense it has as construed by the conscious 
organism. And individual acts of perception and behavior must be 
understood in the broader significance that they have in the life of the 
organism. In all of these respects, behavior is a whole, structurally and 
internally determined by the interrelation of its moments. Ultimately, 
consciousness and nature themselves cannot be understood as opposed and 
isolated domains. At least where the robust notion of behavior is concerned, 
they must be seen as internally and structurally interrelated.16 
Let us return now to Thompson’s view of life-mind continuity in Mind in 
Life. In elaborating the phenomena of mind, life, and experience from different 
dimensions, Thompson has now introduced three distinct perspectives 
(autopoietic, Jonasian, and Merleau-Pontian), each of which can be seen as 
contributing something to the life-mind continuity discussion. But is the 
Merleau-Pontian notion of behavior-as-structure coincident with the Jonasian 
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phenomenological interpretation of metabolism and the autopoietic account 
of cognition?17 Does it, too, admit a foundational continuity running from the 
simplest cases of unicellular life right up to the higher instantiations of animal 
mind and life?  
Merleau-Ponty on life-mind continuity 
In this section, I will argue that, contra Jonas, Merleau-Ponty does not 
admit a phenomenological dimension to life-mind continuity that runs all the 
way down from human experience to the “experience” of unicellular 
organisms. Disentangling Merleau-Ponty’s view from those of Jonas and 
enactivism will not only help us establish historically and exegetically what 
the various authors thought on these topics. I will also suggest that recovering 
a uniquely Merleau-Pontian view points the way towards a qualified version 
of the life-mind continuity thesis that is more defensible than the one 
presented by Jonas and Thompson. It is a view of continuity, however, that 
admits greater discontinuity amid continuity than the Jonasian and 
autopoietic versions of continuity often tend to acknowledge.  
Let us first consider the purely textual basis for adjudicating this issue. 
We begin with The Structure of Behavior, as it is the work most often cited in 
enactivist discussions of life-mind continuity, and the published work in 
which Merleau-Ponty discusses the greatest number and variety of examples 
of animal behavior. The first thing to recall here is that Structure is a book 
about animal behavior. Amid the myriad examples of behavior discussed, 
Merleau-Ponty at no points ascribes “behavior” to any creature outside the 
animal kingdom. Indeed, among the animal’s whose behavior Merleau-Ponty 
discusses, almost all have central nervous systems.18 Further, as already 
mentioned, the objective of Structure is to understand behavior as the 
structural relationship between consciousness – sentience, phenomenal 
consciousness – and nature. As there is little reason to believe that Merleau-
Ponty ascribes consciousness to any living being outside the animal kingdom 
(and Thompson explicitly maintains that, as best we can tell, a nervous system 
is required for consciousness – see below), we should also refrain from 
attributing behavior to non-sentient creatures. Finally, in his characterization 
of the simplest forms of behavior, Merleau-Ponty states that even these are 
“never addressed to isolated objects and always depend upon a large number 
of external conditions.”19 Whether this is true of the putative “behavior” of 
unicellular organisms would require a lengthier discussion than can be 
pursued here, but one can certainly doubt that it is. Moreover, in this context, 
Merleau-Ponty also states that the simplest forms of behavior are “those for 
example that are found in invertebrates.”20 This does not quite amount to 
stating explicitly that the simplest forms of behavior are not also found in 
creatures of lesser complexity than invertebrates or in creatures outside of the 
animal kingdom. Nonetheless, given the focus of the work on the 
sensorimotor action of animals with nervous systems, it seems on the balance 
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of evidence sufficiently clear that Merleau-Ponty’s concept of behavior 
applies only to animals with nervous systems that are at least minimally 
sentient. 
Structure was Merleau-Ponty’s first published monograph. He would 
continue to reflect and write about animals throughout his later work. Still, 
with very few exceptions, his focus is on the sensorimotor behavior and 
experience of animals with nervous systems. One exception of particular 
interest for present purposes occurs in Merleau-Ponty’s Sorbonne lectures on 
Human Sciences and Phenomenology from the early 1950s21, where there is a 
brief discussion of how to interpret the activity of an amoeba, a unicellular 
organism.22 Here, Merleau-Ponty explicitly denies that the activity of the 
amoeba can be understood as “behavior” and in any way compared to human 
or other animal behavior. He refers to the attempt to do so as an “error of 
biologists who attempt to account for the behavior of unicellular beings with 
the aid of categories from human behavior.”23 This error results from “an 
anthropomorphic conception of these tropisms which projects the contents of 
human activity into them.” But, Merleau-Ponty insists, “There is no common 
standard between tropisms and human actions: tropisms are a manner of 
elementary reaction, while human actions almost never offer a constancy of 
this sort.”24 
It is worth mentioning here that one of the main objections that has been 
raised against the phenomenological dimension of the enactivist life-mind 
continuity thesis is precisely that it is anthropomorphic and risks grossly 
misinterpreting the nature of nonhuman life and consciousness by projecting 
structures and categories of our own experience onto nonhuman creatures.25 
In light of this perceived danger, De Jesus has urged enactivists to turn away 
from phenomenology. But as we have just seen, at least where the amoeba is 
concerned, Merleau-Ponty entirely agrees with the allegations of 
anthropomorphism that are cast against a (Jonasian) “phenomenological” 
interpretation of unicellular life. This does not, however, entail that Merleau-
Ponty is opposed to any and all anthropomorphism in the interpretation of 
animal life. Where there really is continuity between human behavior and the 
behavior of nonhuman animals, Merleau-Ponty urges that the latter must be 
interpreted with the aid of an “indispensable anthropomorphism.”26 Unlike 
Jonas and Thompson, however, Merleau-Ponty (at least in Structure and the 
early 1950s lectures) thinks that applying categories from human existence to 
unicellular life is not a case of necessary and beneficial anthropomorphism, 
but of a pernicious anthropomorphism. 
A final group of texts to consider in this discussion are the notes from 
Merleau-Ponty’s courses on nature, delivered at the Collège de France from 
1956-1960. These are of interest both for their detailed discussions and 
interpretations of a variety of biological phenomena as well as for the interest 
that Thompson and other phenomenologically inspired enactivists have taken 
in them. However, we must proceed with caution here. For one, much of the 
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material in these notes is merely provisional. We cannot safely assume that a 
view presented therein is Merleau-Ponty’s considered and final view on any 
issue. Further, long passages from the course notes consist of Merleau-Ponty 
reporting to his students the views of other scientists and philosophers 
concerning the questions at hand. It is thus not always clear whether Merleau-
Ponty is stating a position he himself endorses or if he is simply relaying the 
views of others. This is especially true of the fascinating yet exegetically 
problematic discussions of the views of Jakob Johann von Uexküll in the 
course from 1957-1958.27 It is in those pages that we find a passage and an 
expression very similar to others found in enactivist writings. There, Merleau-
Ponty writes that “In order to grasp the world of the animal, we must not only 
make perception intervene, but also behaviors, because these deposit a 
surplus of signification on the surface of objects.”28 Enactivists, too, often 
speak of a “surplus” of meaning (or significance) to describe the added value 
that an organism’s environment has for it as opposed to the merely objective 
description of the same surroundings.29 In Mind in Life (from 2007), 
Thompson follows Varela in this usage30, but without direct reference to 
Merleau-Ponty. Later, in a follow-up discussion of Mind in Life from 2011, 
Thompson again returns to the idea, this time directly citing Merleau-Ponty. 
In order to keep track of who (von Uexküll, Merleau-Ponty, and Thompson) 
said what, I quote at length Thompson quoting Merleau-Ponty discussing von 
Uexküll: 
When Merleau-Ponty writes, in his lecture course on 
Nature (discussing von Uexküll), “the reactions of the 
animal in the milieu . . . behaviors . . . deposit a surplus of 
significance on the surfaces of objects,” his description 
applies also to microbial life: the reactions of the bacteria in 
their milieu—their tumbling and directed swimming—
deposit a surplus of significance on the surfaces of 
molecules.31  
But this simply raises the question: Does Merleau-Ponty’s description of 
animal behavior also apply to microbial life? And this we must ask both 
substantively (is it in fact so) and exegetically (did Merleau-Ponty in fact claim 
this in his writings).  
As the exegetical question is somewhat easier to answer, we begin with 
it. A fuller look at the context in Merleau-Ponty’s Nature course in which the 
passage occurs is helpful here: 
The higher animal […] constructs an Umwelt that has a 
Gegenwelt, a rejoinder in its nervous system. In his work in 
1934, Uexküll specifies this notion of Gegenwelt. He 
distinguishes the Welt (the objective world) , the Umwelt 
(the milieu tailored to the animal) , and the Gegenwelt, 
which is the Umwelt of higher animals; the interiorized 
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Umwelt is in its turn made up of two systems: the Merkwelt 
and the Wirkwelt. The Merkwelt depends on the way in 
which the sense organs are made. These realize a 
classification of stimuli according to a disposition proper to 
the animal. The Merkwelt is a "grill" interposed between the 
animal and the world. In order to determine the world of 
the animal, we have yet to make the Wirkwelt intervene; that 
is, the reactions of the animal in the milieu, the melodies of 
impulses. In order to grasp the world of the animal, we 
must not only make perception intervene, but also 
behaviors, because these deposit a surplus of signification 
on the surface of objects.32 
Whatever challenges may surround the interpretation of these passages, 
two things should be clear. First, the discussion is expository. Merleau-Ponty 
is here relaying the views of von Uexküll without himself evaluating them. 
As such, we do not know whether Merleau-Ponty himself endorses von 
Uexküll’s position, and the broader context does not settle the question. 
Second, and more importantly, we see that von Uexküll’s substantive view 
(contra Thompson’s appropriation of the passage in question) is that 
“depositing a surplus of signification on the surface of objects” is something 
higher animals do and that lower animals precisely do not do. This ability is 
due to differences between the nervous systems of higher and lower animals. 
Indeed, just prior to this, Merleau-Ponty, again in an expository voice, has 
related that the Gegenwelt of the higher animal is a “new phenomenon”33 as 
opposed to the Umwelt of the lower animal, with which the lower animal 
(such as the sea anemone) constitutes a sort of “cohesion” or “closed unity.”34 
If lower animals do not “deposit a surplus of significance on the surface of 
objects,” then surely neither do much simpler unicellular organisms. 
I find no textual warrant, then, across Merleau-Ponty’s various works, for 
applying phenomenologically informed descriptions of (higher) animal 
sense-making activity to creatures without nervous systems. That is, on the 
textual basis, there is no reason to believe that Merleau-Ponty endorsed a 
phenomenological version of the life-mind continuity thesis that is 
coextensive with Thompson’s and Jonas’. However, there remains the 
substantive question. Is Thompson correct to say that, in fact, von Uexküll’s 
description also applies to unicellular life? My view here is that if that 
particular description is meant to be understood phenomenologically (that is, 
as determining the phenomenological dimension of the life-mind continuity 
thesis), then the answer is no. The reason is simple. The phenomenological 
descriptions that Jonas and Thompson would like to apply to unicellular life 
were fashioned by phenomenologists to describe phenomenal consciousness. 
Paradigmatically, such concepts and terminology were designed to describe 
human experience. With suitable caution and modification, we may also 
apply them to what we posit to be the phenomenal experience of nonhuman 
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animals, assuming we have good reason to believe certain animals have such 
phenomenal experience. Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere following 
Merleau-Ponty, the reconstruction of the lived world of the animal is a 
necessary task for the rigorous study of animal behavior.35 However, it is in 
the domain of phenomenal experience and this domain alone that 
phenomenological descriptions have their sense. To what extent is such 
phenomenal consciousness distributed throughout the organic domain? 
Though at present we do not know for certain, Thompson’s view in Mind in 
Life is the following: 
There is no good reason […] for thinking that autopoietic 
selfhood of the minimal cellular sort involves any kind of 
intentional access on the part of the organism to its 
sensemaking. […] [I]t seems unlikely that minimal 
autopoietic selfhood involves phenomenal selfhood or 
subjectivity, in the sense of a prereflective self-awareness 
constitutive of a phenomenal first-person perspective […]. 
Rather, this sort of awareness would seem to require (in 
ways we do not yet fully understand) the reflexive 
elaboration and interpretation of life processes provided by 
the nervous system.36 
But where there is no phenomenal experience, there is nothing for 
phenomenology to describe and illuminate, nothing for phenomenological 
concepts to apply to. In short, no phenomenality, no phenomenology. 
Applying phenomenological language where there is no phenomenality to 
describe has brought about much confusion within enactivism. It has 
prompted critique of the phenomenologically informed notion of sense-
making from enactivists who are indifferent towards phenomenology37, and 
inspired some to urge that enactivism must take leave of its 
phenomenological heritage.38 The phenomenological dimension of the life-
mind continuity thesis makes much more sense, however, if we restrict its 
application to sentient beings – that is, if we follow Merleau-Ponty rather than 
Jonas.39 
 
Merleau-Ponty and contemporary psychology on human 
and chimpanzee cognition 
A discontinuity thesis? The difference between the cognition and 
experience of humans and other higher animals 
In this section, I will make a small contribution to a Merleau-Pontian 
phenomenological life-mind continuity thesis that might replace the Jonasian 
one currently endorsed by Thompson and other enactivists. I will not attempt 
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to determine what the minimal instance of phenomenal selfhood is in the 
organic domain. Presumably, it will be found among an animal species with 
a nervous system much simpler than that of the human being.  
Instead of focusing on this end of the spectrum, I would like to investigate 
the continuity and discontinuity between human phenomenal experience and 
that of our closest nonhuman kin. In Structure, Merleau-Ponty describes 
discrete higher and lower structures of behavior. However, he also maintains 
that these discrete structures do not correspond to discrete groups of animals, 
as though the difference between higher and lower behavior were itself 
entirely discrete. There is no species of animal, Merleau-Ponty claims, whose 
behavior never rises above the most basic behavioral structure (the syncretic 
forms), just as there is no species whose behavior never descends below the 
most complex (the symbolic forms). Still, he claims, “animals can be distributed 
along this scale according to the type of behavior which is most typical of 
them.”40 This scale would constitute a continuum of lower to higher animals 
viewed from Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological perspective on perception 
and behavior – a phenomenological life-mind continuity thesis.  
This simplistic approach to continuity, however, is problematized by the 
fact that in Structure and other texts from the ensuing decade, Merleau-Ponty 
also often makes rather strong claims concerning the discontinuity between 
the human mind and experience and those of nonhuman animals. In Structure, 
in a discussion of the human order (emergent from the vital order), he states 
that “the word ‘life’ does not have the same meaning in animality and 
humanity.”41 In a public summary and defense of the main ideas of 
Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty claims that “man perceives in a 
way different from any animal.”42 And in a discussion of Wolfgang Köhler’s 
The Intelligence of Apes43, Merleau-Ponty complains that both the Gestalt 
psychologists and the general public have missed what was most remarkable 
in Köhler’s research. For Merleau-Ponty, this was not the somewhat formal 
analogy between the ways in which humans, apes, and other animals actively 
structure (Gestaltung) their perceptual-behavioral worlds. Rather, he would 
like to see more emphasis put on the contrasts between human and nonhuman 
primate cognition. “If [Köhler’s] The Mentality of Apes proves anything,” he 
writes, “it is that one cannot attach the same meaning to intelligence when 
referring to animals as when referring to human beings.”44 
We find a more nuanced statement of what Merleau-Ponty takes this 
essential difference in perception and intelligence to be in Structure and in 
Merleau-Ponty’s early Sorbonne lectures. Representative of these is the 
following passage, from the lectures of 1951-1952:  
Köhler studied the differences between animal and human 
intelligence […]. Chimpanzees are capable of conferring 
new meanings on objects which are not naturally connected 
with them (e.g., they use a stick to get bananas). The old and 
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naturally established totality is destroyed in order to 
establish a new one. This operation merits the name of 
intelligence. However, this form of intelligence is different 
from human intelligence in the following ways: first, optical 
contact is necessary. The stick must not be too distant from 
the goal to be attained for the animal to think of using it. 
The relation of means to goal cannot be stretched to infinity. 
The animal does not make use of time and space in the way 
that humans do. Second, one object cannot take on two 
roles at the same time. The box can have two significations, 
but only alternately; for example, it is either a seat or a 
ladder. The animal does not identify the object via the two 
meanings. The box does not remain the same throughout 
its two functions. Chimpanzees do possess intelligence, but 
it is an intelligence which is expended in the moment. […] 
[By contrast, for humans] a plurality of aspects can be 
perceived as part of one single thing.45 
We can read Merleau-Ponty here as providing an illustrative account of 
what is meant by “depositing a surplus of significance on the surface of 
objects.” Like humans, chimpanzees are capable of giving a new perceptual-
behavioral meaning to an object. In the problem-solving context, what was 
previously just a natural object lying about in the environment suddenly 
becomes a tool with a radically new application: it can be used to extend the 
chimp’s reach so as to obtain an objective that was hitherto out of reach. “To 
reason,” Merleau-Ponty summarizes, “is not just to perceive relations 
between two objects; it is to perceive between them a new or third relation.”46 
However, Merleau-Ponty urges that there are critical differences between 
human and chimpanzee intelligence. First, he maintains that for the 
chimpanzee to be able to achieve this new “conferral of meaning,” the object 
upon which the new meaning is conferred cannot be too remote in time and 
space from the new context in which it is to be applied. This is different from 
human intelligence, which, presumably, can overcome a much greater 
spatiotemporal distance between the object whose meaning is to be 
reconceived and the context in which it is to be applied. Indeed, neither need 
even be really present, as human problem-solving often operates in an 
entirely imaginary-visual or symbolic modality. Second, Merleau-Ponty 
claims that when the chimpanzee confers a new meaning upon the object, it 
necessarily abolishes the old one. If it had previously used the box as a ladder 
to obtain a suspended objective, but it is now currently using the box as a seat, 
the old meaning (box-as-ladder) has now been utterly annihilated to make 
room for the new one (box-as-seat). For the human, by contrast, these two 
meanings can be retained simultaneously, or perhaps one remains present in 
its possibility even while another is being actualized (box-as-seat(-but-also-
potentially-as-ladder)). Merleau-Ponty makes this point elsewhere with a 
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colorful analogy. Animal intelligence, he says, exhausts itself 
“kaleidoscopically” when it produces a new landscape for action.47 Human 
intelligence, by contrast, is presumably capable off a superimposition of 
meanings, in which the old are still retained, visible in their virtuality, as it 
were. 
Merleau-Ponty first made these claims seventy-five years ago. The study 
of animal behavior was still relatively young at the time. Merleau-Ponty bases 
much of his understanding of chimpanzee behavior on Köhler’s revolutionary 
The Mentality of Apes. The ensuing decades have seen an astonishing 
proliferation of research on animal intelligence and behavior. Chimpanzees 
have been an especially well studied species, often in a comparative context, 
and the past few decades have garnered remarkable and insightful findings. 
How do Merleau-Ponty’s claims hold up in light of this recent research? 
Merleau-Ponty claims that “optical contact” is required between the 
object upon which a new meaning is bestowed and the context in which its 
new meaning belongs in order for the chimpanzee to accomplish such 
meaning bestowal. The idea that the animal lives in a closed hic et nunc and is 
incapable of transposing itself into an imagined reality has a long pedigree in 
human-animal comparisons in philosophy and psychology.48 This view has 
come under pressure in recent years, however, from studies on animal 
episodic memory and future planning. In some cases, a chimpanzee must 
inhibit a current desire in order to secure an objective for later – for example, 
suppressing the desire to go after a hidden food cache that only it knows 
about until a later time when no higher-ranking group members, who might 
well pull rank and confiscate the snack, will be present. And Frans de Waal 
tells the story of a chimpanzee who trekked over a half kilometer with a 
fifteen-pound stone on its back. It then used this stone to break open nuts 
beneath an especially bountiful palm tree. Clearly, when the chimpanzee 
conferred the meaning “stone-as-nutcracker” on the rock, it had no “optical 
contact” with the problem-solving context in which it would eventually apply 
it. Further interpretation would be required, but such examples at least make 
a strong prima facie claim to refute Merleau-Ponty’s first purported difference 
between human and ape cognition.49 
What about the second point, the claim that the chimpanzee’s 
perspectival cognition is not of the same kind as that of the human? 
Remarkably, there is a striking convergence between Merleau-Ponty’s view 
and the one espoused in the most recent work in comparative psychology and 
primatology by Michael Tomasello.50 Tomasello maintains that chimpanzees 
never achieve properly perspectival cognition. This is because to achieve a 
properly perspectival view on an object one must be capable of grasping that 
there are other, different possible perspectives on one and the same thing. In 
human development, this occurs through the development of social cognition 
in the first years of life. Through social interaction, children learn to compare 
their own experience and perspective on the world with those of others. This 
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development occurs in stages, but the traditional test of mature perspectival 
cognition is the false belief test. To pass this test, the subject must demonstrate 
that it understands that another person may have a false belief about the way 
the world is and will act in accordance with this false knowledge rather than 
the way the world in fact is. Under most normal developmental 
circumstances, children three and younger will fail false belief tests while at 
around four or five they begin to pass. 
Tomasello sums up his view and explains why chimpanzee cognition 
never arrives at properly perspectival cognition (i.e., the insight that “box-as-
seat = box-as-ladder”): 
[P]erspective-taking [in the strict sense] requires that a 
subject imagine more than one way of perceiving or 
understanding a given entity or situation; there can be no 
such thing as a single perspective on something without at 
least the possibility of other perspectives on it.51 
However, this leaves us with something of a puzzle to explain why 
chimpanzees do not acquire the kind of perspective-taking that is 
characteristic of human cognition. Recent research, much of it coming from 
Tomasello’s own labs, has demonstrated that chimpanzees are in fact capable 
of much more impressive feats of social cognition than had once been thought. 
Indeed, some of these abilities look to be the direct antecedents of perspective-
taking in the strict sense. Chimpanzees raised in captivity learn to use the 
pointing gesture with at least some range of application. They can imagine 
what others perceive (e.g., they can follow the gaze direction of an 
experimenter, will change their position to see what the experimenter is 
looking at if their own view is obstructed, and understand when the 
experimenter’s vision is occluded). They understand the specific content of a 
conspecific’s perception. And in recent years, great apes have even succeeded 
at certain “implicit” measures of false belief, which infants also pass prior to 
the second year of life.52 All told, chimpanzees possess a suite of social-
cognitive abilities very similar to that of a two-year-old infant. The infant uses 
this as a foundation to advance to properly perspectival cognition and an 
explicit understanding of false belief. The chimpanzee does not. Why?  
Tomasello’s answer is that, although the chimpanzee is able to imagine 
what another chimpanzee perceives or knows, he never goes so far as to 
actively juxtapose such knowledge with his own conflicting perspective or 
knowledge. Hence, he never gains the insight into perspective, fundamental 
to human perspective-taking, that multiple discrepant or even contradictory 
perspectives on the same object can coexist at one and the same time. When 
the chimpanzee tracks or imagines what another chimpanzee perceives or 
knows, 
[his] own perception of the situation [is] not an object of 
attention at all (the participant is seeing “through” his 
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perceptual experience, not examining it or comparing it to 
something else). When the participant is imagining 
[another chimpanzee] seeing something (or not), he is 
simply tracking her [i.e., the other chimpanzee’s] 
perceptual experience—full stop—irrespective of what he 
himself is or is not experiencing. Without an awareness of 
multiple potential ways of seeing the situation, an 
individual cannot be said to be taking perspectives at all.53 
Or, to put this in Merleau-Ponty’s complementary idiom, the object as the 
observing chimp sees it and the object as the observed chimp sees it 
are two distinct and alternative objects in the behavior of 
the chimpanzee and not two aspects of an identical thing. In 
other words, the animal cannot at each moment adopt a 
point of view with regard to objects which is chosen at its 
discretion.54 
Or, again,  
Animal activity […] loses itself in the real transformations 
which it accomplishes and cannot reiterate them. For man, 
on the contrary, the tree branch which has become a stick 
will remain precisely a tree-branch-which-has-become-a-
stick, the same thing in two different functions and visible 
for him under a plurality of aspects.55 
But this solution only passes the explanatory buck one step down the line. 
For we must now ask why, though the chimpanzee is capable of imagining 
the experience of another chimpanzee, it never achieves the active 
juxtaposition of its own perspective with that of the other chimpanzee. In 
humans, as we have seen, this ability reaches its mature form somewhere 
around four years of age and constitutes a decisive departure from the shared 
great ape cognition that younger children demonstrate. Is such cognitive-
perceptual perspective-taking intrinsically different in kind from the abilities 
shared between humans and apes that precedes it? Should it be treated as a 
continuous development from previous abilities that for some contingent 
reason the chimpanzee never undergoes? What is the role of language and 
other higher-order elements of human cognition in this development? And 
what does this apparent discontinuity entail for the continuity between 
human and chimpanzee experience within the phenomenological dimension 
of the life-mind continuity thesis? 
Continuity restored: A developmental perspective 
To begin answering these questions, I will now discuss some of the 
developmental factors that lead up to and, I will suggest, play a formative role 
in the acquisition of mature, explicit false belief understanding in humans. In 
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doing so, I will attempt to chart a more or less continuous trajectory between 
early infant cognition, in so many respects similar to the cognition of other 
great apes, and the uniquely human form of perspectival cognition described 
by Merleau-Ponty and Tomasello.  
1. Joint attention. For most of the first year of life, the infant’s 
social interactions primarily occur through a dyadic mode 
of face-to-face exchanges of vocalizations, gestures, and 
expressions with caretakers known as protoconversations. 
Other great apes do not participate in this uniquely human 
mode of emotional bonding. Towards the end of the first 
year, the dyadic structure expands to a triadic structure 
where infant and caretaker are jointly oriented towards an 
object of interest in the proximate environment. For joint 
attention to be properly joint, it is not sufficient that infant 
and caretaker both happen to be attending to the same 
object. Rather, each individual is attuned also to the 
attunement of the other to the object. Infants can follow a 
caretaker’s gaze or pointing gesture and now produce their 
own pointing gestures as well. Chimpanzees, as we have 
seen, follow gaze and produce pointing gestures. However, 
their range of motivation for doing so is much more limited 
than that of the human infant. They point almost 
exclusively with imperative motivations, in order to get 
someone to do something for them. Human infants, by 
contrast, also point to or present objects to caretakers with 
declarative motivations. A one-year-old infant will share an 
object with a caretaker just for the sheer joy of sharing it, a 
sort of extension of the face-to-face emotional connectivity 
of the protoconversation to include a third term. Further, 
they will take an interest in the way in which the caretaker 
is directed towards the object, monitoring how the 
caretaker emotionally responds to the object and what she 
does with it. Chimpanzees do not do this. Note, however, 
that there is no reason to assume that the absence of this 
behavior is the result of some sort of cognitive deficit. 
Rather, chimpanzees simply do not appear to be interested 
in this kind of self-other-object way of interacting.56 
2. Symbolic play and pretense. Midway through the second 
year of life, infants begin engaging in symbolic play and 
other forms of pretense. In symbolic play, the infant 
behaves with an object as though it were something other 
than what it is. For example, a banana can serve as a 
pretend phone, or a block can be treated as though it were 
a car. Symbolic play is critical for the development of 
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perspective-taking and perspectival cognition, for it is 
practice at deliberately reassigning the use-meaning that 
the child attaches to an object. Much like pointing, symbolic 
play appears to be just about uniquely human but not quite. 
The strongest claims for symbolic play in nonhuman 
animals – though not the only ones – come unsurprisingly 
from great apes raised in captivity, especially those who 
have been given some linguistic training.57 This may 
suggest that apes are in principle capable of symbolic play, 
but that a suitable environment and models for imitation 
are required for the ability to come to expression as it does 
in human children. There is a strong correlation between 
the development of symbolic play and the development of 
social cognition and language.58 
3. Language acquisition. The acquisition of language is 
correlated with developments in social cognition and likely 
plays a facilitating role in the formation of a uniquely 
human mode of perspectival cognition. This is likely 
because language is pervasively aspectual. In the simplest 
case, the same object can be described in different ways and 
can even be designated with different proper and common 
nouns. The infant’s “mommy” also bears a proper name, is 
perhaps someone’s wife, and is the manager of her 
company. The young child initially struggles with and even 
rejects the possibility of multiple names for the same thing, 
but gradually comes to accept and even relish in these 
possibilities and the aspectual character of language. 
Another example of the perspectival character of language 
is of especial interest for present purposes. Verbs that 
express propositional attitudes – such as “know,” 
“believe,” “hope,” “fear,” etc. – encode the perspective of 
the sentence subject. Thus, for example, the sentences “the 
ball is black,” “Tom believes the ball is white,” and “Jane 
believes the ball is green” express a perspectival conflict of 
beliefs between the way the world is and the way people 
variously believe it to be. In a false belief experiment, 
Lohman and Tomasello59 demonstrated that a brief 
training session with language can help children at around 
the threshold age for false belief understanding to pass a 
false belief test that they had previously failed. The training 
consisted of presenting the child with an object and asking 
her what she thinks it is; then presenting new information 
that reveals the object to be something other than the child 
initially believed it to be; then asking the child to compare 
her current and previous beliefs. This training was 
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sufficient to help children who had previously failed a 
standard false belief test to pass the same test. In a control 
condition, children were given a similar experience with a 
misleading object, but without the linguistic scaffolding of 
the experience. This condition did not lead to an 
improvement on the false belief task. 
What these three critical developmental acquisitions from the first years 
of childhood leading up to explicit understanding of false belief all have in 
common is that they all make perspective salient. In joint attention, the child 
is paying attention to the perspective of the caretaker. A potential contrast or 
conflict – for example, in emotional evaluation of an object of joint attention – 
turns perspective into something of a practical puzzle in the infant’s world 
that requires resolution. In symbolic play, the child is practicing conferring, 
alternating between, and jointly holding in view contrasting meanings. This 
is precisely the ability that Merleau-Ponty maintains the chimpanzee is 
incapable of. In treating the banana as a telephone, the child is playfully and 
actively exploring the possibility of assigning two meanings to the same 
object. In doing so, however, she surely never loses sight of the fact that the 
banana is also something she can eat. Hence, unlike the chimpanzee (who, 
Merleau-Ponty claims, must “destroy” the previous meaning totality in order 
to create a new one), the child treating the banana as a phone never loses sight 
of the identity of the object across its various meanings: banana-as-
“telephone” = banana-as-food. And in language, the child acquires a 
representational means that is thoroughly perspectival on various levels. 
Language offers a way to think about and alternate perspectives that demands 
a comparatively low cognitive load, as opposed to the comparatively high-
fidelity, and hence high-load, modes of perspective-switching such as joint 
attention and symbolic play.  
How can we interpret these findings from a phenomenological 
perspective, and what bearing do they have on the phenomenological 
dimension of the life-mind continuity hypothesis? I will here draw inspiration 
from Merleau-Ponty’s extensive lectures on developmental psychology to 
present an interpretation of these facts in the style of Merleau-Ponty’s work 
in this field.60 However, my own account departs from Merleau-Ponty’s on 
some points of considerable importance for understanding the 
phenomenological dimension of life-mind continuity. The reason for the 
departure, I believe, is that more recent research contradicts some of Merleau-
Ponty’s views on both primate and early infant cognition. 
My proposal is that through the constant confrontation with perspectives 
and the practice in perspective-switching and -taking that humans 
accumulate in childhood, a perspectival, intersubjective perception of the 
world becomes a habituated and latent component of all normal human 
experience.61 The possibility of seeing an object differently, or of conferring a 
new meaning upon it, constantly and habitually accompanies human 
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perception as a result of our long apprenticeship in switching perspectives 
and conferring new meanings. We are always at least implicitly, liminally 
aware that this object could be seen in a different way, or could be put to a 
new use. And to some extent, we know this about our experience. 
Chimpanzees are in fact capable of conferring new meanings and seeing 
things in different ways. However, for want of practice, and for want of a rich 
intersubjective, linguistic, and cultural world in which assigning new 
meanings to objects and taking alternative perspectives is a common 
occurrence, they never habituate this possibility for new perspective into their 
experience and hence do not know about themselves that they have this 
capability. Human beings, by contrast, constantly confronted with contrasts 
and conflicts of perspectives and the possibility of new perspectives, become 
something like folk theorists of their own and other’s perspectives. Or, as 
Merleau-Ponty puts it in Phenomenology of Perception, there is a “genius for 
ambiguity that might well serve to define man.”62  
Does this transformation of the child’s experience occur all at once 
through something like Gestalt switch, a sort of “ah-ha!” moment of insight 
into the nature of perspective; or does it gradually unfold through steady 
habituation and practice of perspectival awareness through activities such as 
joint attention and symbolic play? Research on theory of mind development 
suggests that preschool-age children acquire different aspects of the 
understanding of perspective in a sequential manner, though one that varies 
slightly cross-culturally.63 For example, they come to understand that people 
can have diverse desires for the same object before they understand that people 
can have diverse beliefs about the same object, and understanding diverse 
beliefs precedes understanding false beliefs. Whether each of these scaled 
abilities are acquired all at once or gradually is unknown. The finding, 
discussed above, that language-scaffolded training sessions can induce 
success on explicit false belief tasks in children who had previously failed 
them may seem to suggest an all-at-once development. However, it might 
simply be that the training teaches children to transfer into an explicit and 
discursive register something that they already know on a more basic, 
perceptual level. As for whether language is necessary for full mastery of 
explicit false belief tests, or whether it simply facilitates such mastery, we 
simply do not know. My hunch is that the latter is the case. Using language 
to reason about false beliefs demands a comparatively low cognitive load, and 
many forms of linguistic expression make perspective salient to us in ways 
that are relevant for passing false belief tests. It may be possible to arrive at a 
similar understanding of false belief through, for example, an active empathic 
simulation of the other’s experience. However, this task presents a much 
heavier cognitive load, and circumstances do not force it upon us in the same 
way that many conventional linguistic forms do.  
Where does this leave the phenomenological dimension of the life-mind 
continuity thesis? Viewed statically, as it were, comparing the normal 
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experience of the adult human with that of the adult chimpanzee, we find that 
there is a uniquely aspectual character and openness to variability in human 
experience that is lacking in the chimpanzee’s experience. The counterpart of 
this is the human’s ability to take the perspective of another and compare it 
with her own in ways the chimpanzee never appears to do. These are 
differences in kind. However, from a genetic perspective, we see these 
differences in kind may be acquired gradually throughout ontogeny. And 
their acquisition is driven by a difference in the affective orientation and 
motivations of the human child. Further, they are scaffolded and facilitated 
by a linguistic, cultural, and intersubjective milieu uniquely tailored to bring 
the child’s potential for social cognition and language to fruition. In this way, 
we can recognize the macroscopic discontinuity between human and 
chimpanzee ways of life and experience, while also restoring a sort of 
microscopic continuity in development. 
On this last point, my own interpretation may soften some of Merleau-
Ponty’s starker statements of the discontinuity between the perception and 
behavior of human and nonhuman animals – between the vital and human 
orders, as he labels them in Structure. I believe this modification to follow from 
the current state of knowledge in developmental and comparative 
psychology, which has advanced considerably in the intervening decades. In 
addition to the achievements in social cognition discussed above, we now 
know that chimpanzees in the wild also exhibit cultural learning (e.g., tool use 
that varies between groups and is passed down across generations).64 
Meanwhile, Merleau-Ponty also appears to have maintained that even the 
earliest advancements in infantile perception are necessarily and pervasively 
social. He seems to have held that the first object of perception is the mother 
and that it is through her that the infant comes to learn about the material 
world. Additionally, following the scientific consensus of his time, Merleau-
Ponty did not believe that newborns were capable of visual focus65, and hence 
that it was only somewhat later in the first year that they began to constitute 
a world of objects – always by way of the face of the other, which is the first 
“object” for the infant. Hence, for Merleau-Ponty, the “original objects” of 
“nascent perception” are “the actions of other human subjects.”66 More recent 
research on neonatal vision challenges this view.67 Though the neonate’s 
power for vision is certainly limited, and it does demonstrate a preference for 
faces, the vision of neonates and young infants is generally more precocious 
and robust than Merleau-Ponty knew. As a result, the infant has some access 
to a world of objects that is not necessarily mediated by the gestures and 
actions of other humans. Merleau-Ponty’s remarks on the importance and 
precociousness of social perception are surely correct, but he overstates the 
dependence of object perception on social perception. 
The chimpanzee, then, rises above the “purely vital” order to a greater 
degree than Merleau-Ponty recognized. At the same time, the perception of 
the human infant is more thoroughly grounded in it and less dependent on 
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the human order for the infant’s developing relationship to the external world 
than Merleau-Ponty believed. In this way, we can narrow the gap somewhat 
between the two orders and add an important qualification to Merleau-
Ponty’s claim that the human being perceives in a way different from other 
animals. This leaves us with a more continuous account of the difference 
between human and non-human animal cognition and experience than what 
we find in Merleau-Ponty. At the same time, it is a nuanced account, informed 
by the most recent empirical research, of the discontinuities Merleau-Ponty 
was partially right to stress. It thus does justice to his intuitions, which have 
not been sufficiently acknowledged in the works of phenomenologically 
inspired enactivists, that there are important differences between the 
phenomenal experience of human and non-human animals. 
Conclusion  
In the preceding discussion, I have attempted to provide a concrete and 
specific account of phenomenological continuity and discontinuity between 
the experience of the human being, the prototypical subject of 
phenomenological description, and that of a nonhuman animal, to whom 
those same descriptions, we have seen, apply with some modification. In 
doing so, I hope to have provided a nuanced take on the continuity between 
the phenomenal experience of these two species that can serve as a model for 
developing the concrete “phenomenological ethology”68 of nonhuman 
animals.   
What other discontinuous continuities might such concrete 
investigations discover along an overarching phenomenological life-mind 
continuity thesis? As we have seen, Merleau-Ponty, following von Uexküll, 
may have acknowledged a discontinuity between higher and lower animals, 
with the latter living in a sort of “closed unity” or “cohesion” with their 
worlds (or Umwelten). By contrast, the higher animal, such as the chimpanzee 
or human, confers new meanings on objects. How are we to characterize the 
phenomenal experience (assuming they have such) of those lower animals 
that have no central nervous system and no precise exteroceptive sense 
organs? Can such an animal be said to have “objects” at all? Are there animals 
that have objects, but that are not capable of conferring new meanings on 
them? What abnormal human experiences might allow us to render more 
accessible such foreign experiences? And what is it like to be a bat, an octopus, 
or a worm? 
Pursuing such questions with concrete empirical work (both controlled 
experiments and natural observation) interpreted with the help of 
phenomenology may provide answers, however provisional and speculative 
these may need remain. However, it may be that the deeper unity – if there is 
one – of the phenomenological and empirical dimensions of life-mind 
continuity will remain obscure so long as both dimensions of investigation 
are conducted in the absence of an undergirding ontology that clarifies the 
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relationship between the phenomenal and the natural. In the meantime, 
whatever fascinating correlations we discover between phenomenological 
and empirical investigations will remain just that, correlations. Merleau-
Ponty, from the first lines of Structure, his first book, to the late lectures on the 
concept of nature, to the final drafts for the unfinished The Visible and the 
Invisible, was concerned to develop such an ontology that would clarify the 
place of consciousness in the cosmos. This monumental task still stands before 
contemporary phenomenology and cognitive science, and the preceding 
investigations would need to be revised and transcribed within the broader 
context of such a fundamental ontology.69 
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